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Commissioner v. Schleier. Adding Insult to "Personal
Injury?"
Prior to the 1992 Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Burke,' the federal income tax treatment of damages received under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Ace seemed well-settled as
numerous courts of appeals had held that such amounts were entirely
excludable from income as "damages received ... on account of
personal injuries" under § 104(a)(2)' of the Internal Revenue Code.4
In holding that back pay received in settlement of a sex discrimination
claim brought under the pre-1991 version of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19645 was taxable,6 the Burke Court reasoned that the
type of personal injury action contemplated by § 104(a)(2) is one that
provides a broad range of remedies to compensate the victim.7
Although apparently intended to supply a new, clear direction for
courts to handle taxation of discrimination awards, Burke instead
created chaos in the ADEA context as various courts applied the
reasoning of this decision in differing ways to reach totally opposite
results.8 In fact, taxpayers who recovered damages under the same
ADEA class settlement against United Air Lines received completely
different federal income tax treatment depending on the judicial
circuit in which they resided.9
1. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
2. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994)
[hereinafter referred to as the ADEA].
3. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994). Section 104(a)(2) provides, in relevant part, that gross
income does not include "the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or
agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal
injuries or sickness." Id.
4. Redfield v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 940 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1991); Pistillo v.
Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990); Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir.
1990); Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150 (1991), affd on reh'g, 100 T.C. 634 (1993),
rev'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988), amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
6. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1992).
7. See id. at 234-37.
8. See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
9. Compare Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that
United settlement is taxable), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995) with Schmitz v.
Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that United settlement is not taxable),
vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2573 (1995) (mem.) and Schleier v. Commissioner, 26 F.3d 1119 (5th
Cir. 1994) (opinion not officially reported) (same), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
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In Commissioner v. Schleier,'° the Supreme Court affirmatively
ended this confusion by holding, six to three, that back pay and
liquidated damages received in settlement of an ADEA lawsuit were
not excludable from gross income under § 104(a)(2)." The Court
revealed that § 104(a)(2) contains two independent requirements that
must be met before exclusion is allowed, and it found that ADEA
damages fail to satisfy either since they are not recovered through a
tort or tort type cause of action and are not received on account of
personal injuries.' 2
This Note begins by summarizing the facts behind the ADEA
settlement award at issue in Schleier3 and proceeds to explain the
reasoning in the majority'4 and dissenting 5 opinions. Next, the Note
outlines the history and development of § 104(a)(2), discussing the
recent expansion of the scope of the statute with respect to damages
received for nonphysical injuries.' 6  The Note then analyzes the
standard utilized by the Schleier Court for measuring compliance with
§ 104(a)(2)'s first requirement that the underlying claim giving rise to
the damages award must be based upon "tort or tort type rights,"
concluding that the Court's approach leads to disparate income tax
treatment of similarly situated individuals.' This Note also examines
the Court's justifications for adopting a second restrictive requirement
under § 104(a)(2) that damages must be received "on account of"
personal injuries and concludes that such a result is inconsistent with
the language of the statute and its underlying Treasury regulation."
Finally, this Note explores the Court's application of § 104(a)(2)'s two
requirements in Schleier and suggests the possible ramifications for
damages received outside of the ADEA context.'9
Erich Schleier worked as a pilot for United Air Lines until his
employment was terminated at age sixty in accordance with an
established company policy.' Schleier brought suit under the
10. 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
11. IMt at 2167.
12. Id.
13. See infra notes 20-32 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 33-65 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 66-86 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 87-174 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 175-96 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 197-227 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 228-53 and accompanying text.
20. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2161. Federal Aviation Administration regulations bar
individuals from serving as pilots on a commercial aircraft upon reaching age 60, but they
do not preclude such persons from serving as second officers (i.e., flight engineers). See
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ADEA,2' and his claim was later joined in a class action brought by
similarly situated employees challenging the United policy.22 The
plaintiffs prevailed in the lower court, where a jury found that United
had committed a willful violation of the ADEA, 3 but that judgment
was later reversed on appeal2 4 The parties then entered into a
settlement agreement under which Schleier personally received
$145,629, half of which was attributed to back pay and half to
liquidated damages.'
On his 1986 federal income tax return, Schleier reported the back
pay portion of the United settlement as gross income but excluded the
liquidated damages entirely.26 When the IRS challenged exclusion of
the liquidated damages,. Schleier responded by filing suit in the Tax
Court.27 In addition to clafiming he had properly excluded the
14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1995). In contrast, the United policy prohibited pilots age sixty or
older from holding any position in the flight crew, including that of a second officer.
Monroe v. United Air Lines, Inc., 736 F.2d 394, 398 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 469
U.S. 1198, and cert denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985); Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150,
153 (1991), affid on reh'g, 100 T.C. 634 (1993), rev'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995). Pilots such as Mr. Schleier contested United's refusal to
allow them to transfer to second officer positions upon turning 60 years old in lieu of
mandatory retirement. See Monroe, 736 F.2d at 397; Downey, 97 T.C. at 154.
21. The ADEA "broadly prohibits arbitrary discrimination in the workplace based on
age." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 120 (1985) (quoting Lorillard
v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994) (stating that the
purpose of the ADEA is "to promote employment of older persons based on their ability
rather than age [and] to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment"). Among
other things, the ADEA makes it unlawful to refuse to hire or to discharge an individual
who is at least 40 years old, or to otherwise discriminate against such individual with
respect to employment circumstances, because of such individual's age. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 623(a)(1), 631(a) (1994).
22. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2161-62.
23. Id. at 2162. For a summary of the facts and holding of the case, see Monroe, 736
F.2d at 397-99.
24. Monroe, 736 F.2d at 409.
25. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2162. Such an allocation is consistent with the remedial
structure of the ADEA, which permits recovery of lost wages and, when the violation is
willful, liquidated damages of an equal amount. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b) (1994). These
remedial provisions are borrowed from the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (1994) (hereinafter referred to as the FLSA), and are incorporated by reference
into the ADEA. §§ 216(b), 626(b). However, although liquidated damages are
automatically available upon any violation of the FLSA, § 216(b), they are available under
the ADEA only upon the occurrence of a willful violation, § 626(b). The otherwise
mandatory award of liquidated damages under the FLSA can nevertheless be avoided or
reduced at the court's discretion if the employer demonstrates that it acted in good faith
and had reasonable grounds for believing its action was not a violation of the Act. 29
U.S.C. § 260 (1994).
26. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2162.
27. Id.
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liquidated damages from his income, Schieier argued that the back
wages should also be excludable.2 The Tax Court held that the entire
settlement proceeds were excludable from gross income by way of
§ 104(a)(2), 9 and that decision was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals." Due to the varying federal income tax treatment
of ADEA recoveries among the courts of appeals,31 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict below.32
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision, holding
that neither the back pay nor the liquidated damages portion of
Schleier's ADEA settlement qualified for exclusion from gross income
under § 104(a)(2). 3  Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,34
explained that two independent requirements must be met before
§ 104(a)(2) is applicable: (1) the underlying cause of action giving
rise to the damages recovery must be "based upon tort or tort type
rights;" and (2) the damages must be received "on account of
personal injuries or sickness."'35 Reasoning that the "on account of
personal injuries" phraseology is found in both the "plain language"
of the statutory text and again in the first sentence of the underlying
Treasury regulation,36 the Court concluded that "[t]he regulatory
28. Id.
29. Schleier v. Commissioner, No. 22909-90, 1993 WL 767976 (T.C. July 7, 1993).
30. Commissioner v. Schleier, 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir. 1994) (opinion not officially
reported). A copy of the court's opinion can be found at 74 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 94-5049
(5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). The Fifth Circuit relied exclusively on its prior decision in
Purcell v. Seguin State Bank & Trust Co., 999 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1993), for purposes of its
per curiam disposition of the case. 74 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 94-5049. Purcell in turn simply
relied on the Tax Court's decision in Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 634 (1993), rev'd,
33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995), in holding that ADEA
damages were nontaxable for purposes of reviewing the amount of a judgment for ADEA
violations. 999 F.2d at 960-61. As this succession illustrates, the Fifth Circuit never
performed its own analysis with respect to the applicability of § 104(a)(2) to ADEA
damages.
31. See supra note 9.
32. Commissioner v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 507 (1994) (mem.) (granting the petition for
certiorari).
33. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167.
34. Id. at 2161. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer
joined the majority opinion. Id. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment but did not
author a separate opinion. Id.
35. Id. at 2167.
36. Id. at 2165-66. The regulation provides:
Section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income the amount of any damages
received (whether by suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or
sickness. The term "damages received (whether by suit or agreement)" means
an amount received.., through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon
tort or tort type rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of
1644 [Vol. 74
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requirement that the amount be received in a tort type action is not
a substitute for the statutory requirement that the amount be received
'on account of personal injuries or sickness'; it is an additional
requirement."37 The Court was not troubled that the IRS had
previously taken the position that the second sentence of the
regulation superseded the first, although the Court purportedly did
not give deference to the Service's contrary interpretation of the
regulation here because of this inconsistency.3s
Moreover, the Court indicated that a two-step analysis is not
inconsistent with its application of § 104(a)(2) in United States v.
Burke,39 where it considered only the first requirement of the statute
and made no mention of any additional requirement.' The majority
explained that
[al]though Burke relied on Title VII's failure to qualify as an
action based upon tort type rights, [the Burke Court] did not
intend to eliminate the basic requirement found in both the
statute and the regulation that only amounts received 'on
account of personal injuries or sickness' come within
§ 104(a)(2)'s exclusion.41
The Court also refused to consider a recent revenue ruling in which
the IRS implied a contrary interpretation of Burke;4' the majority
simply dismissed the pronouncement as lacking authority in the face
of plain statutory language 3
The Court next applied the requirements of its two-prong test
and first sought to determine whether the respective elements of
Schleier's ADEA settlement were received "on account of personal
injuries."44 Rather than adopting a standard or rule to guide this
such prosecution.
Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 1970).
37. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2166.
38. Id. at 2166 n.7. Ordinarily, the Service's interpretation of a Treasury regulation,
if reasonable, is entitled to deference from the court. E.g., Jewett v. Commissioner, 455
U.S. 305, 318 (1982); Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 69 F.3d 1404, 1408 (8th Cir. 1995).
39. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
40. See Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167.
41. Id.
42. See Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61, suspended, I.R.S. Notice 95-45, 1995-34 I.R.B.
20. In this ruling, the IRS followed Burke but applied only a "tort or tort type" cause of
action requirement, holding that all compensatory damages, including back pay, received
from discrimination claims brought under certain federal statutes (not including the
ADEA) would be excludable from gross income under § 104(a)(2). Id.
43. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167 n.8 (citing Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 132
(1947)).
44. Id. at 2163-65.
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inquiry, Justice Stevens illustrated how to apply the requirement by
way of a hypothetical example in which a victim is physically injured
in an automobile accident and recovers a settlement for medical
expenses, lost wages (recompensing for time out of work due to the
injuries), and pain, suffering, and emotional distress. 45 In such a case,
the Court indicated, the entire settlement would represent damages
received "on account of" personal injuries. 46
Unlike the lost wages recovered in the automobile accident
hypothetical, however, Schleier's ADEA back wages were adjudged
not to be recovered "on account of" any personal injury.47 The
Court's words here are crucial to an understanding of this revelation:
Whether one treats [Schleier's] attaining the age of 60 or his
being laid off on account of his age as the proximate cause
of [his] loss of income, neither the birthday nor the discharge
can fairly be described as a "personal injury" or "sickness."
Moreover, though [Schleier's] unlawful termination may
have caused some psychological or "personal" injury
comparable to the intangible pain and suffering caused by an
automobile accident, it is clear that no part of [his] recovery
of back wages is attributable to that injury. Thus, in our
automobile hypothetical, the accident causes a personal
injury which in turn causes a loss of wages. In age discrimi-
nation, the discrimination causes both personal injury and
loss of wages, but neither is linked to the other. The
amount of back wages recovered is completely independent
of the existence or extent of any personal injury.4"
This reasoning can be briefly summarized as follows. The
automobile accident causes its victim a physical disability or impair-
ment, which constitutes a personal injury under § 104(a)(2). 49
Moreover, this physical impairment may prevent the victim from
working for a period of time. Hence, any recovery for lost wages is
received "on account of" the victim's personal injury. Similarly, age
discrimination causes its victim various intangible harms (e.g., loss of
45. IdL at 2163-64.
46. ld at 2164. The hypothetical was apparently intended to be self-explanatory as
the Court said little beyond its conclusory declaration that these particular damages were
received "on account of" personal injuries. In regard to the damages for pain, suffering,
and emotional distress, the Court reiterated the well-settled position that § 104(a)(2)
includes recoveries for both tangible and intangible injuries. Id. at 2164 n.4; see also infra
notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
47. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2164.
48. Id.
49. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
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dignity) that can also constitute personal injury."0 However, these
intangible harms are not what causes the victim's loss of employment;
rather, the employer's wrongful discharge and refusal to allow the
victim to work can be said to be the cause of any lost wages in this
context. Therefore, according to Justice Stevens, back wages
recovered from an age discrimination claim are not received "on
account of" the personal injuries caused by such discrimination.
Before applying the on account of personal injuries test to
ADEA liquidated damages, the Court first had to identify the
intended purpose of this particular remedy. Relying on its prior
decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,5 the Court restated
its belief that "Congress intended for [ADEA] liquidated damages to
be punitive in nature."'52 The Court was not persuaded by the
taxpayer's argument that because liquidated damages under the Fair
Labor Standards Act were determined by the Supreme Court to serve
a compensatory purpose,53 Congress, by incorporating this FLSA
remedial provision into the ADEA, must have therefore intended for
ADEA liquidated damages to also operate, at least in part, as a
compensatory device.54 In cursory fashion, Justice Stevens indicated
50. See infra note 56.
51. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
52. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2165 (quoting Thurston, 469 U.S. at 125). The Thurston
Court made this statement in the context of defining the standard for willfulness under the
ADEA. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 125-26. It relied on excerpts from the Congressional
Record relevant to the original adoption of the ADEA, in which legislators suggested that
a liquidated damages provision would provide a more effective deterrent to willful
violations of the Act than the criminal penalty originally proposed. Id Apparently, the
Court attributed this justification to the entire enacting Congress by the fact that the
liquidated damages provision was ultimately incorporated into the ADEA instead of the
criminal sanctions found in the original version of the bill. See id. The Schleier majority
found solace in this prior determination in Thurston because ADEA liquidated damages
are only available in situations where the employer acts willfully. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at
2165 n.5 ("If liquidated damages were designed to compensate ADEA victims, we see no
reason why the employer's knowledge of the unlawfulness of his conduct should be the
determinative factor in the award of liquidated damages.").
53. In Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942), the Court observed
that FLSA liquidated damages "are compensation, not a penalty or punishment by the
Government," and that such damages might compensate for "damages too obscure and
difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated damages." Id. at 583-84; accord
Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945).
54. The text of the legislative history accompanying the 1978 amendments to the
ADEA states that the purpose of ADEA liquidated damages is to "compensate the
aggrieved party for nonpecuniary losses arising out of a willful violation of the ADEA."
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
528, 535, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 535 (emphasis added). The report continues:
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that both Schleier's argument and the ADEA legislative history were
included in the briefs presented to the Thurston Court, and thus the
Court's statement of congressional intent can only mean that they
were rejected.5 After determining that ADEA liquidated damages
were entirely punitive in nature, the Court held, without further
explanation, that such damages were also not received "on account
of" any personal injury 6
At this point it seems the Court could have ended its discussion,
given that both parts of Schieier's ADEA settlement failed to satisfy
one of § 104(a)(2)'s essential elements. Nonetheless, the majority
proceeded to examine the other requirement of § 104(a)(2) and held
that an ADEA claim is not one that is "based upon tort or tort type
rights.""7
For purposes of this second inquiry, the Court followed the
reasoning of its decision in United States v. Burke.8 The primary
characteristic of an action based upon tort or tort type rights, as
conceived by Burke, is the "availability of compensatory remedies."59
Specifically, the Court suggested that a tort-like cause of action must
provide compensation for "any of the other traditional harms
associated with personal injury, such as pain and suffering, emotional
distress, harm to reputation, or other consequential damages." 6°
Against this background, the Court held that an ADEA claim is
not based upon tort or tort type rights due to the absence of
compensatory relief in the remedial scheme of the Act.61 Like the
The ADEA as amended by this act does not provide remedies of a punitive
nature.... [T]he Supreme Court has made clear [in MisseJ that an award of
liquidated damages under the FLSA is not a penalty but rather is available in
order to provide full compensatory relief for losses that are "too obscure and
difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated damages."
Id at 14 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
55. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2165 & n.5.
56. Id at 2165. Although ADEA back wages and liquidated damages did not qualify
for exclusion under § 104(a)(2), the majority did recognize that the intangible harms of
discrimination can constitute a personal injury within the meaning of the statute and that
any compensation received on account of such harms may be excludable from income. Id.
at 2165 n.6.
57. Id at 2166-67.
58. 504 U.S. 229 (1992). See infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text for a complete
discussion of Burke.
59. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2166. The Court emphasized its statement in Burke that
"one -of the hallmarks of traditional tort liability is the availability of a broad range of
damages to compensate the plaintiff fairly for injuries caused by the violation of his legal
rights." Id (quoting Burke, 504. U.S. at 235).
60. See id at 2167 (quoting Burke, 504 U.S. at 239).
61. Id
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pre-1991 version of Title VII at issue in Burke, the ADEA does not
provide relief for "any of the other traditional hamis associated with
personal injury" 6 -- back wages were described as being of an
"economic character" and ADEA liquidated damages had been
adjudged to lack any compensatory function.63 Moreover, the fact
that a jury trial 4 and punitive damages (i.e., liquidated damages) are
available under the ADEA was not sufficient to alter this result
despite the emphasis placed on the absence of these factors in Burke.
The Court noted:
It is true... that we emphasized in Burke the lack of a right
to a jury trial and the absence of any provision for punitive
damages as factors distinguishing the pre-1991 Title VII
action from traditional tort litigation. We did not, however,
indicate that the presence of either or both of those factors
would be sufficient to bring a statutory claim within the
coverage of the regulation.65
Justice O'Connor, writing for the dissent,66 attacked the
majority's reasoning on two separate grounds. She first decried their
"on account of personal injuries" analysis as restricting the scope of
a personal injury under § 104(a)(2) to tangible physical and mental
injuries only,67 a result contrary to the majority's affirmation that the
statute also applies to intangible injuries68 such as those flowing from
illegal discrimination.69 Pointing specifically to the statement that
neither Mr. Schleier's sixtieth birthday nor his wrongful discharge
constitutes a personal injury,7" Justice O'Connor argued that this
reasoning "is not reconcilable with the Court's recognition that the
intangible harms of illegal discrimination constitute 'personal injuries'
under § 104(a)(2). 71
62. See supra text accompanying note 60 for a representative list of these "other"
harms.
63. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1994); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 585 (1978).
65. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2166 (citation omitted).
66. Id. at 2167 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion was joined by
Justice Thomas in full and Justice Souter in part. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 2169-70 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
68. See supra note 46.
69. See supra note 56.
70. See supra text accompanying note 48.
71. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2170 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor referred
to this as the "fundamental defect" in the majority's analysis. Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). In a separate footnote devoted especially to the dissent's remarks, the
majority replied as follows: "[T]o acknowledge that discrimination may cause intangible
harms is not to say that the ADEA compensates for such harms, or that any of the
1996] 1649
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Justice O'Connor seemingly preferred the pre-Burke standard in
Threlkeld v. Commissioner" for applying § 104(a)(2), 73 as she also
renewed her criticism of Burke's focus on the remedies available to
the plaintiff for purposes of determining whether a claim represents
a tort-like cause of action.74 The Threlkeld court held that a personal
injury occurs any time an individual's personal rights are violated,71
and Justice O'Connor argued that age discrimination "surely"
constitutes a personal injury under this standard.76 Once this type of
personal injury is established, Justice O'Connor contended that all
damages received for such discrimination are received on account of
personal injuries and should therefore be excludable from income
under § 104(a)(2).77
In addition, the dissent separately argued that the taxpayer's
ADEA settlement would still qualify for § 104(a)(2) exclusion under
the principles of Burke.7 ' To establish that an ADEA claim falls
within Burke's definition of a tort-like personal injury action, the
dissent directed its analysis at distinguishing the broader remedial
scheme of the ADEA from the pre-1991 Title VII claim at issue in
Burke, which effectively allowed back wages as the only monetary
remedy.79 First, Justice O'Connor indicated that the ADEA offers
plaintiffs a trial by jury as contrasted to pre-1991 Title VII, which did
not. 0 More importantly, in addition to just back wages, the ADEA
damages received were on account of those harms." Id. at 2165 n.6. Justice O'Connor's
response was simple: "The logic of this argument is rather hard to follow. If the harms
caused by discrimination constitute personal injury, then amounts received as damages for
such discrimination are received 'on account of personal injuries' and should be excludable
under § 104(a)(2)." Id. at 2170 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
72. 87 T.C. 1294 (1986) (en banc), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988). See infra notes
109-19 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of Threlkeld.
73. See Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2168-70 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 2169 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he remedies available... do not fix the
character of the right they seek to enforce.") (quoting United States v. Burke, 504 U.S.
229, 249 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
75. Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1308.
76. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2168 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor supported
this position by citing several Supreme Court decisions, many of which were her own
concurring or dissenting opinions, that essentially characterized employment discrimination
in all forms as an invasion of the victim's personal rights and dignity. Id- Note, however,
that these cases involved the prosecution of the discrimination claim itself and not the
income tax consequences of the resulting damages award.
77. Id at 2170 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
78. 1d at 2170-72 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
79. See id. at 2170 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
80. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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also allows recovery of liquidated damages." Even if the purpose
of these damages is punitive as the majority asserts, Justice O'Connor
argued that punitive damages are traditionally available only in tort
actions. 2 The dissent concluded that these distinguishing features
sufficed to qualify an ADEA claim as a tort-like personal injury
action under Burke.3
Moreover, Justice O'Connor explained that this should be the
end of the inquiry under Burke, and accordingly she took exception
to the majority's adoption of a two-prong test that, in her belief, is
contrary to the Service's formal and consistent position over the last
thirty-five years that the second sentence of § 1.104-1(c) 4 conclusive-
ly establishes the only requirement of § 104(a)(2)." Justice
O'Connor was disturbed by the Court's nonchalant dismissal of the
Service's reasonable interpretation of the regulation in favor of "the
plain language of a statute" whose language is "anything but
plain. 8 6
When viewed in light of the contemporary history of § 104(a)(2),
the Supreme Court's decision in Schleier represents a subtle yet
radical change in the scope of the statute that was hardly self-evident.
Although the earliest administrative pronouncements endorsed a
restrictive interpretation of the predecessor to § 104(a)(2), suggesting
that it applied only to damages received for physical injuries,' this
exclusion developed over time into a much broader provision that
would eventually come to embrace myriad nonphysical injuries,
including recoveries from dignitary torts" and employment
discrimination claims.8 9 At this point, it is useful to examine these
developments in further detail in order to appreciate the implications
of Schleier in this area.
The starting point for imposition of the federal income tax on
individuals is section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code, which broadly
81. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
82. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
83. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
84. See supra note 36 for the relevant text of the regulation.
85. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2170-72 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
86. Id at 2171-72 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
87. See Sol. Mem. 1384, 1920-2 C.B. 71 (holding that damages received for alienation
of affections are not excludable from income under the predecessor to § 104(a)(2) and
interpreting the statutory phrase "personal injuries" to mean physical injuries only),
revoked, Sol. Op. 132, I- C.B. 92 (1922); Sol. Mem. 957, 1919-1 C.B. 65 (holding that
damages received for libel are taxable), modified, Sol. Op. 132, I- C.B. 92 (1922).
88. See infra notes 98-119 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 120-23, 129-42 and accompanying text.
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defines gross income to encompass "all income from whatever source
derived" unless excluded elsewhere in the Code." Judicial recog-
nition has been given to the sweeping scope of this section as courts
have stated that Congress, in defining gross income, intended to use
the "full measure of its taxing power" to "tax all gains except those
specifically exempted."91 Consistent with the broad effect given to
the definition of gross income, statutes providing for exclusions
therefrom must be narrowly construed. 2
The specific exclusion relevant here, § 104(a)(2),93 traces its
roots back to the Revenue Act of 1918"4 and has remained in
substantially the same form ever since.' 5 The prevailing rationale for
§ 104(a)(2) has historically been that "[d]amages paid for personal
injuries are excluded from gross income because they make the
taxpayer whole from a previous loss of personal rights-because, in
effect, they restore a loss to capital. 9 6
90. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1994).
91. E.g., Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 82-83 (1977); Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429-30 (1955).
92. E.g., United States v. Centennial Say. Bank FSB, 499 U.S. 573, 583 (1991);
Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949); cf Andress v. United States, 198 F.
Supp. 371,376 (N.D. Ohio 1961) (noting that while statutes allowing deductions from gross
income are generally to be strictly construed, courts are "liberal in construing ...
enactments intended to give tax relief to injured or sick employees").
93. For a comprehensive discussion of § 104(a)(2), see BORIS I. BITrKER & MARTIN
J. MCMAHON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 7.3 (2d ed. 1995 &
Supp. 1996).
94. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1065-66 (1919) (codified
as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994)).
95. The original version of the statute provided that gross income does not include
"[a]mounts received, through accident or health insurance or under workmen's
compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of
any damages received whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or
sickness." § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. at 1066.
96. Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1962); see also BITrKER &
MCMAHON, JR., supra note 93, 7.3[1], at 7-6 to 7-7 ("The rationale for the exclusion...
is presumably that the recovery does not generate a gain or profit but only makes the
taxpayer whole by compensating for a loss."). But see Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d
693, 696 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983) (suggesting that while a recovery for personal injuries
technically falls within the modem definition of gross income, Congress in its "compassion"
allows the § 104(a)(2) exclusion to remain). For excellent discussions of the various
justifications for allowing personal injury damages to be excluded from income, see Robert
J. Henry, Torts and Taxes, Taxes and Torts: The Taxation of Personal Injury Recoveries,
23 Hous. L. REV. 701,723-29 (1986), and Edward Yorio, The Taxation of Damages: Tax
and Non-Tax Policy Considerations, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 701 (1977). After scrutinizing
the various justifications, many commentators have concluded that a satisfactory
explanation for the § 104(a)(2) exclusion does not exist. See, e.g., Mark W. Cochran,
Should Personal Injury Damage Awards Be Taxed?, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 43, 64-65
(1987); Henry, supra, at 723-24, 742. Some have even gone so far as to advocate full or
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In situations where an individual recovers compensatory damages
for physical injuries, it has been invariably clear that all amounts
received, including lost wages, are excludable from gross income
pursuant to § 104(a)(2).97 Likewise, it has long been accepted that
nonphysical injuries can also constitute "personal injuries" within the
meaning of the statute." However, the exclusion as it pertained to
certain nonphysical injuries like defamation was originally more
limited in scope. In such cases, the Tax Court would often engage in
an initial inquiry to determine whether the consequences of the
defamation resulted in injury to the taxpayer's personal or profes-
sional (i.e., business) reputation; exclusion under § 104(a)(2) was then
allowed only for those damages received on behalf of the former.99
In Roemer v. Commissioner,'0° the Ninth Circuit recognized this
disparate treatment of physical and nonphysical injuries and firmly
rejected it: "The relevant distinction that should be made is between
personal and nonpersonal injuries, not between physical and non-
physical injuries."' 0 ' The court rationalized that when damages are
recovered for a physical injury, the amount received is not allocated
between the "personal aspects of the injury and the economic loss
occasioned by the personal injury."'" Accordingly, no such al-
partial repeal of the statute on this basis. See Cochran, supra, at 65; Lawrence A. Frolik,
Personal Injury Compensation as a Tax Preference, 37 ME. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (1985).
97. E.g., Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1300 (1986) (en banc), affd, 848
F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988); Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50; Henry, supra note 96, at 704-05.
98. E.g., United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229,235 n.6 (1992); Rickel v. Commissioner,
900 F.2d 655, 658 (3d Cir. 1990); BITrKER & MCMAHON, JR., supra note 93, 7.3[2], at
7-7. But cf. Burke, 504 U.S. at 242-46 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing
under principles of statutory interpretation that "personal injury" as used in § 104(a)(2)
should be construed to mean only tangible physical and mental injuries). See generally J.
Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Tax Treatment of Employment-Related Personal Injury
Awards: The Need for Limits, 50 MONT. L. REv. 13, 14-23 (1989) (discussing in
considerable depth the origin and development of the exclusion from income of damages
received for nonphysical injuries).
99. See Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1104, 1109-10 (1983); Roemer v. Commis-
sioner, 79 T.C. 398, 405-06 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983); Glynn v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C. 116, 120 (1981), af'd without published opinion, 676 F.2d 682 (1st
Cir. 1982). The IRS endorsed this position also. See Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18, 19,
superseded, Rev. Rul. 85-98, 1985-2 C.B. 51.
100. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'g 79 T.C. 398 (1982). In Roemer, the taxpayer
had recovered damages in a defamation lawsuit brought as a result of a grossly defamatory
credit report. 79 T.C. at 400. The Tax Court found that the taxpayer's compensatory
damages were received for injury to his professional reputation (e.g., lost business income),
id. at 406, and held that such amounts must be reported as income, id. at 407.
101. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 697.
102. Id.
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location should be performed when nonphysical injuries are at
issue.'0'
The court then examined applicable state law and determined
that defamation causes a personal injury"° for which all damages
received-both for injury to personal reputation and injury to
professional reputation-can be excluded from income under
§ 104(a)(2).' 5 The court reasoned that "[w]hile some of these
relationships may be personal and some may be professional, all of
the harm that is done flows from the same personal attack" on the
victim's good name:a°6
This injury to the person should not be confused with the
derivative consequences of the defamatory attack, i.e., the
loss of reputation in the community and any resulting loss of
income. The nonpersonal consequences of a personal injury,
such as a loss of future income, are often the most per-
suasive means of proving the extent of the injury that was
suffered. The personal nature of an injury should not be
defined by its effect. 7
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Roemer introduced a new manner
of applying § 104(a)(2) to damages received for nonphysical inju-
ries."~' In Threlkeld v. Commissioner,'09 the Tax Court was again
confronted with the issue of whether damages awarded for injury to
professional reputation were taxable.' After reflecting on the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Roemer and the prior Tax Court opinions
103. Id. at 696-97 ("[W]e have concluded that the tax court's analysis of this matter
confuses a personal injury with its consequences and illogically distinguishes physical from
nonphysical personal injuries.").
104. Specifically, the court referred to the "Personal Rights" section of the state civil
code, where the statutory provisions recognized a general personal right to be protected
from defamation. Id. at 699. This methodology is exemplary of what it means to examine
the "nature of the claim" to ascertain whether a personal injury exists. See id. at 697
("[W]e must look to the nature of the tort of defamation to determine whether the award
should have been reported as gross income.").
105. Id. at 697-700.
106. Id. at 700 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 699.
108. Despite its defeat in Roemer, the IRS refused to concede its position and
announced that it would not follow the Ninth Circuit's decision, electing instead to
embrace the Tax Court's reasoning that a defamatory statement that causes loss of
business income is an injury to the business as distinguished from a personal injury. Rev.
Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55.
109. 87 T.C. 1294 (1986) (en banc), affd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
110. In Threlkeld, the taxpayer settled a state action for malicious prosecution, and the
parties labeled a portion of the proceeds as consideration for the taxpayer's release of any
claims for injury to his professional reputation. Id. at 1294-97.
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recognizing the personal/professional reputation dichotomy, the full
Tax Court rejected this distinction."'
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Threlkeld decision was
its methodology for determining excludability under § 104(a)(2)
outlined as follows:
Section 104(a)(2) excludes from income amounts received as
damages on account of personal injuries. Therefore,
whether the damages are paid on account of "personal
injuries" should be the beginning and the end of the inquiry.
To determine whether the injury complained of is personal,
we must look to the origin and character of the claim and
not to the consequences that result from the injury.112
As is evident from the language above, the Tax Court, like the
Ninth Circuit in Roemer,"' defined a personal injury by looking to
the "nature of the claim." 1 14  The Tax Court also integrated the
regulations under § 104(a)(2)" 5 into its analysis by recognizing that
"common law tort concepts are helpful in deciding whether a taxpayer
is being compensated for a 'personal injury.' ,116 Broadly stated,
the Threlkeld analysis reveals that "[e]xclusion under § 104 will be
appropriate if compensatory damages are received on account of any
invasion of the rights that an individual is granted by virtue of being
111. Id. at 1298-1305. To justify its conclusion, the court offered an analytical
demonstration of the illogical result that follows from its disparate treatment of physical
and nonphysical injuries. Id. at 1300-01. In a hypothetical situation in which a surgeon
loses a finger due to the tortious conduct of another, all would agree that in addition to
excluding any recovery for personal losses such as physical and mental pain and suffering,
the victim could also exclude damages compensating for professional losses like lost future
income. Id. However, when a nonphysical injury caused by a dignitary tort such as
defamation occurred, the court would have previously "ignored the personal nature of the
claim and delved into an inquiry regarding the nature of the consequences of the injury,"
the ultimate result being that damages for injury to personal reputation were excludable
while damages for injury to professional reputation were not. Id. The Tax Court termed
this inconsistency between physical and nonphysical injuries "analytically irreconcilable."
Id. at 1301.
112. Id. at 1299 (citations omitted). Many courts would come to follow this analysis in
deciding the tax status of damages received under federal statutes proscribing various
forms of employment discrimination. See e.g., Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119,1121
(6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 504 U.S. 229 (1992); Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145, 148 (6th
Cir. 1990); Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1990).
113. See supra note 104.
114. See Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1305 ("The determination of whether damages are
received on account of a personal injury properly depends on the nature of the claim.").
115. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 1970). See supra note 36 for the relevant
text of the regulation.
116. Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1305.
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a person in the sight of the law.',1 7  Applying this standard, the
court determined that the nature of the claim at issue, malicious
prosecution, was an action to redress personal injuries under state
law"8 such that all compensatory damages received, including those
for harm to professional reputation, were excludable from gross
income under § 104(a)(2)." 9
In the wake of Threlkeld, § 104(a)(2) was expanded beyond the
common law dignitary tort context to encompass recoveries under
various federal statutory causes of action predominantly related to
employment discrimination." In several of these cases, the courts
rejected the IRS's argument that damages for an economic loss such
as back wages were not received as compensation for personal
injuries.12 Rather, the courts examined the nature of the claim,
117. Id at 1308.
118. Id. at 1306-07. To discover the "nature of the claim," the court relied on the fact
that malicious prosecution was recognized as a distinct tort under state law and that the
statute of limitations applicable to this type of claim generally concerned personal tort
actions. ld. at 1307.
119. Id. at 1308.
120. E.g., Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119,1123 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that back
wages received in settlement of pre-1991 Title VII sex discrimination claim were
excludable from income), rev'd, 504 U.S. 229 (1992); Byrne v. Commissioner, 883 F.2d 211,
215 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that damages, including back wages, received in settlement of
FLSA retaliatory discharge and state law wrongful discharge claims were excludable from
income); Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67, 70 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that damages,
including back wages, received in settlement of § 1983 claim for violation of constitutional
right to free speech were excludable from income); Metzger v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834,
858 (1987) (holding that damages allocable to claims of employment discrimination on the
basis of sex and national origin brought under §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985(3), 1986, and Title
VII were excludable from income), affd without published opinion, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir.
1988); cf. Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709,712 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that back
wages recovered in settlement of sex discrimination claim brought under Title VII and
Equal Pay Act (EPA) were not excludable from income since they represent a contract
claim for earned but unpaid wages, as contrasted to traditional tort actions where back
wages are paid for inability to earn income due to tortious conduct of another, but also
holding that EPA liquidated damages were excludable from income since designed in part
to compensate victim for intangible losses). But see Sparrow v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d
434, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that back pay award received in settlement of pre-1991
Title VII racial discrimination claim was not excludable from income), cert. denied, 505
U.S. 1211 (1992). For a more complete discussion of these developments, see Burke &
Friel, supra note 98, at 28-38, and Richard T. Helleloid & Joanne H. Turner, Tax Status
of Employment Discrimination Awards and Settlements, 15 REV. "IAX'N INDIVIDUALS 127,
129, 134-39 (1991).
121. E.g., Burke, 929 F.2d at 1122; Byrne, 883 F.2d at 214; Bent, 835 F.2d at 70. The
Sixth Circuit's response in Burke was typical: "[T]he government [improperly] focuses its
analysis on the consequences of a Title VII violation (the payment of back pay for lost
wages) rather than the personal nature of the injury (invidious discrimination)." 929 F.2d
at 1122.
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without reference to the consequences of the injury, to determine
whether the statute in question was analogous to a tort-like cause of
action designed to redress personal injuries." If so, then the
analysis ceased-all damages resulting from such a claim were
excludable from income as damages received on account of personal
injuries under § 104(a)(2)."z
In response to judicial expansion, § 104(a)(2) was amended in
19892 to include the following provision: "Paragraph (2) shall not
apply to any punitive damages in connection with a case not involving
physical injury or physical sickness."'" The accompanying legis-
lative history revealed the House's concern over how courts had
broadly interpreted § 104(a)(2) to allow exclusion of damages
received in cases not involving physical injury (e.g., cases involving
employment discrimination and defamation)." The House bill
therefore proposed to restrict the scope of the statute to cover only
damages that relate to a physical injury or physical sickness. 27
However, as reflected by the final amendment, only punitive damages
received in cases not involving physical injury were ultimately made
122. In examining the "nature of the claim" to determine whether a particular statute
constituted a tort type cause of action, these courts relied on, inter alia, the fact that a
personal injury statute of limitations was applicable to the claim, see Metzger, 88 T.C. at
850-56, a belief that the particular employment discrimination claim was more analogous
to a tort than a breach of contract action, see Byrne, 883 F.2d at 215, and the reasoning
of other judicial opinions characterizing the statute as a tort-like personal injury action and
recognizing that invidious discrimination in general causes a personal injury, see Burke, 929
F.2d at 1121-22; Metzger, 88 T.C. at 850-56.. Interestingly, the court in Metzger determined
that relief under Title VII could recompense a personal injury given that this cause of
action seeks to prohibit the same type of conduct as § 1981, notwithstanding the stark
differences in the remedial schemes of the two statutes. Metzger, 88 T.C. at 856-58
("[A]ithough the relief sought under one statute may in some cases be different from the
relief sought under the other statute, the injuries complained of are often essentially the
same.").
123. See Burke, 929 F.2d at 1121-23; Byrne, 883 F.2d at 214-16; Metzger, 88 T.C. at 850-
58. Note that excludability of punitive damages was not an issue in any of these cases.
124. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641,103 Stat.
2106, 2379.
125. § 7641, 103 Stat. at 2379. This amendment generally applies to punitive damages
received in taxable years ending after July 10, 1989, or received on account of a lawsuit
pending as of such date. Id. Therefore, the amendment is not applicable to Schleier, see
Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2162-63 & n.3, nor is it applicable to any of the other cases cited in
this Note unless otherwise indicated.
126. H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1354-55 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2824-25.
127. Id. Similar legislation has again been proposed and is currently pending in
Congress. See infra note 263.
1996] 1657
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
taxable." Hence the exclusion as it pertained to compensatory
damages received for nonphysical personal injuries emerged un-
scathed.
The first major federal appellate decision to address the taxability
of damages awarded under the ADEA was Rickel v. Commis-
sioner.29 The taxpayer in Rickel settled an ADEA lawsuit with his
former employer, receiving as consideration a payment that the Tax
Court allocated evenly between back pay and liquidated damages. 3 '
Reflecting on its prior decisions in Bent v. Commissioner and Byrne
v. Commissioner,' the Third Circuit again embraced the Threlkeld
approach as the proper analysis for § 104(a)(2) issues.' In correct-
ing the Tax Court's misapplication of this doctrine to the facts of the
instant case, the Third Circuit instructed as follows:
[O]nce it found that age discrimination was analogous to a
personal injury and that the taxpayer's ADEA action
amounted to the assertion of a tort type right, the Tax Court
should have ended its analysis and found that all damages
flowing therefrom were excludable under § 104(a)(2) .... By
going further and rummaging through the taxpayer's prayers
for relief in order to determine the nature of his claim, the
Tax Court was simply defining the nature of the taxpayer's
injury by reference to its nonpersonal consequences ....
[T]he nonpersonal, economic effects of the employer's act of
discrimination, e.g., loss of wages, does not transform a
personal tort type claim into one for nonpersonal inju-
ries. 33
The court in Rickel also had no trouble deciding that the nature
of an age discrimination claim was more analogous to a personal
128. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 622-23 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3018, 3225-26.
129. 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990). Several courts of appeals prior to Rickel had
presumed that ADEA recoveries would be taxable, but their statements were made in the
context of reviewing and fashioning judgments for ADEA violations, and the issue of
taxability was not directly before them. See Gelof v. Papineau, 829 F.2d 452, 455-56 (3d
Cir. 1987); Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473,1480 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
874 (1984).
130. Rickel, 900 F.2d at 656-57, 661. For the rationale behind this allocation, see supra
note 25. The Tax Court determined that the amount received as liquidated damages
represented compensation for a tort-like personal injury, but it held that back wages were
in the nature of a breach of contract action and thus were not excludable from income.
Rickel, 900 F.2d at 661.
131. See supra note 120.
132. Rickel, 900 F.2d at 658-61.
133. Id. at 661-62 (citation omitted).
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injury tort than to a breach of contract action."M First, it recognized
that the antidiscrimination provisions of the ADEA arise by operation
of law to remedy wrongful conduct, independent of any obligations
incident to an express or implied employment contract.'35 In
addition, the court analogized to an abundance of Supreme Court and
federal appellate decisions labeling various forms of employment
discrimination as personal injuries and characterizing the statutes
designed to redress such discrimination as fundamentally actions in
tort.36 Moreover, the court believed that its outcome was but-
tressed by the legislative history behind the 1989 amendment to
§ 104(a)(2), 137 arguing that "Congress chose to implicitly endorse the
courts' expansive interpretation of § 104(a)(2) to encompass nonphysi-
cal injuries and merely circumscribe the scope of the exemption as to
only one type of remedy, i.e., punitive damages, and not other types
of remedies typically available in employment discrimination cases,
such as back pay."'3
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Rickel court held that the
taxpayer's age discrimination suit under the ADEA was analogous to
the assertion of a tort type right to redress a personal injury such that
all damages received, both liquidated damages 39 and back
wages,'" were excludable from income under § 104(a)(2).141 The
134. Id at 662.
135. Id.
136. Id at 662-63. For a sample of these decisions, see Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.,
482 U.S. 656, 661 (1987) ("[R]acial discrimination ... is a fundamental injury to the
individual rights of a person."); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,277 (1985) (analogizing a
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which "is an injury to the individual rights of the person"); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189,
195-96 n.10 (1974) (dictum) (analogizing an action to redress racial discrimination to an
action for defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev.
Corp., 597 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 1979) ("An action based upon the federal an-
tidiscrimination statutes is essentially an action in tort."); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven
Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 517 F.2d 1141, 1143 (4th Cir. 1975) ("An action brought under
statutes forbidding racial discrimination is fundamentally for the redress of a tort.").
Following the Threlkeld rhetoric closely, the court used decisions such as these to conclude
that "[b]y discriminating against the taxpayer on the basis of his age, [the employer]
invaded the rights that the taxpayer 'is granted by virtue of being a person in the sight of
the law.' "Rickel, 900 F.2d at 663 (quoting Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1308
(1986) (en banc), affd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988)).
137. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
138. Rickel, 900 F.2d at 664.
139. With regard to ADEA liquidated damages, the court proceeded under the
assumption that such damages were not punitive since the IRS did not appeal that issue
from the Tax Court. Id at 661 n.8.
140. Once again, the Third Circuit patently rejected the Service's argument that back
pay awarded in the employment discrimination context does not represent compensation
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reasoning of Rickel was uniformly adopted by subsequent courts
charged with determining the tax status of ADEA recoveries. 42
The Tax Court was first to explore in depth the issue of whether,
for tax purposes, ADEA liquidated damages were intended solely to
serve a punitive and deterrent purpose, or whether they concurrently
operated to compensate victims of age discrimination for certain
intangible, nonpecuniary losses.43 Such an exercise became useful
in light of the Service's argument that ADEA liquidated damages
were entirely punitive in nature and therefore were designed to
punish the defendant, rather than to compensate the plaintiff for any
personal injury.'44
While the Tax Court conceded that the Supreme Court's
declaration in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,145 that
Congress intended for ADEA liquidated damages to be punitive in
nature,"4 supported the IRS position, it urged that this statement
must be taken in context. 47 From the employer's perspective, which
for personal injuries. L at 662 n.9 (" '[W]e find this argument to have been rejected in
Bent [and Byrne] and we reject it again here' for the third time.") (alteration in original)
(quoting Byrne v. Commissioner, 883 F.2d 211, 214 (3d Cir. 1989)).
141. Id. at 667.
142. Redfield v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 940 F.2d 542,544-46 (9th Cir. 1991); Pistillo
v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990); Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150, 156-
58 (1991), affd on reh'g, 100 T.C. 634 (1993), rev'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995).
143. See Downey, 97 T.C. at 171-73; Rickel v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 510,521-22 (1989),
rev'd on other grounds, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990). To this point, the federal appellate
courts never had occasion to consider this issue in depth, either because the tax status of
back wages was the only issue before the court, see Redfield, 940 F.2d at 544; Pistillo, 912
F.2d at 146-47, or because the lower court's disposition of the issue was not challenged on
appeal, see Rickel, 900 F.2d at 661 n.8.
144. Downey, 97 T.C. at 170; Rickel, 92 T.C. at 521. A finding that ADEA liquidated
damages were wholly or partially compensatory provided a simple avenue to dismiss the
Service's argument. However, even if such damages were found to be entirely punitive,
the court would still have needed to decide whether punitive damages received in a
personal injury action were excludable under the appropriate version of § 104(a)(2).
Downey, 97 T.C. at 170. This latter issue, like many others derived from § 104(a)(2),
developed into a subject of much debate among the courts. Compare Horton v.
Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994) (concluding that punitive damages received in
personal injury action were excludable from income under § 104(a)(2)), aff'g 100 T.C. 93
(1993) with Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that
punitive damages received in personal injury action were taxable) and Commissioner v.
Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990) (same).
145. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
146. Id. at 125; see also supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
147. See Downey, 97 T.C. at 171.
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was at issue in Thurston,"4 the punitive objectives of ADEA
liquidated damages are manifest-these damages represent an
effective deterrent to willful violations of the Act. 49 However,
when viewed from the victim's perspective, the Tax Court did not
believe that Thurston foreclosed the possibility that ADEA liquidated
damages could also serve a compensatory purpose to remunerate
various nonpecuniary losses that are difficult to prove and calcu-
late.' To support this argument, the court cited numerous appel-
late decisions concluding that ADEA liquidated damages serve both
a compensatory and a punitive function, 5' analogized to the compen-
satory purpose ascribed by the Supreme Court to FLSA liquidated
damages (which are incorporated into the ADEA by express
reference)," and cited text from the ADEA legislative history 53
ostensibly adopting the FLSA analogy.Y Upon finding that ADEA
liquidated damages did serve a compensatory purpose, the Tax Court
readily allowed exclusion under § 104(a)(2). s
After years of fairly consistent, albeit expansive, application of
the Threlkeld standard,'56 the tide abruptly changed and the scope
of § 104(a)(2) was moderately narrowed. In United States v.
Burke, 7 the Supreme Court considered whether back pay received
in settlement of a gender discrimination claim brought under the pre-
1991 version of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964158 qualified
for exclusion under § 104(a)(2). 59 The Sixth Circuit applied the
Threlkeld "nature of the claim" analysis in traditional fashion and
148. The Thurston Court briefly considered the purpose of ADEA liquidated damages
in connection with defining the standard for willfulness under the Act. Thurston, 469 U.S.
at 125-26; see also supra note 52.
149. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 125; Downey, 97 T.C. at 171.
150. Downey, 97 T.C. at 171.
151. See, e.g., Powers v. Grinnell Corp., 915 F.2d 34, 41-42 (1st Cir. 1990) (ADEA
liquidated damages serve dual punitive and compensatory purposes); Graefenhain v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198,1205 (7th Cir. 1989) (same); Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829
F.2d 367, 382 (3d Cir. 1987) (same). Contra Reichman v. Bonsignore, Brignati &
Mazzotta, P.C., 818 F.2d 278, 281-82 (2d Cir. 1987) (ADEA liquidated damages are
punitive only); Lindsey v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 810 F.2d 1094, 1102 & n.7 (l1th
Cir. 1987) (same).
152. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 54.
154. Downey, 97 T.C. at 172-73.
155. Id. at 173.
156. See cases cited supra notes 120, 129, 142.
157. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
158. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988), amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
159. Burke, 504 U.S. at 230.
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found that sex discrimination in general caused a tort-like personal
injury sufficient to permit the taxpayer to exclude her back pay from
income.'6' Although the Supreme Court purportedly agreed that it
was appropriate to examine the nature of the claim underlying the
damages award for this purpose, citing Threlkeld with approval, 161
its vision of what constituted an action based upon tort or tort type
rights was markedly different in that great emphasis was placed on the
remedies available to the victim. 62 Indeed, the Court remarked
that "one of the hallmarks of traditional tort liability is the availability
of a broad range of damages to compensate the plaintiff 'fairly for
injuries caused by the violation of his legal rights,' " often including
indemnity in excess of pecuniary losses.'6
The Court then examined the remedial scheme of the pre-1991
version of Title VII to determine whether the statute possessed these
160. See Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1121-23 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 504 U.S.
229 (1992); see also supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
161. Burke, 504 U.S. at 237.
162. I at 233-37.
163. Id at 235 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 (1978)). The substance of
the Court's analysis here marked a dramatic change in the procedure for identifying
whether a claim seeks to redress a tort-like personal injury. Although the Court alleged
that it was proper to look at the nature of the claim for this purpose, the emphasis it
placed on available remedies was a far cry from the traditional Threlkeld analysis that
flourished prior to this decision. See supra notes 122, 134-36 and accompanying text.
While the Court acknowledged that invidious discrimination does inflict harm on its
victims, it maintained that this of itself was not sufficient to invoke § 104(a)(2): "The fact
that employment discrimination causes harm to individuals does not automatically imply,
however, that there exists a tort-like 'personal injury' for purposes of federal income tax
law." Burke, 504 U.S. at 238. Rather, the focus must be directed at the remedies available
to redress such discrimination. Id. Consistent with this approach, the Court rejected any
general analogy of Title VII claims to other antidiscrimination statutes judicially
characterized as tort-like personal injury actions, labeling such an argument as "unpersua-
sive in light of those statutes' differing remedial schemes." Id. at 240-41 n.11. Further-
more, in response to the dissent's criticism that "[f]ocusing on remedies ... misapprehends
the nature of the inquiry required by § 104(a)(2)," id. at 249-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting),
the majority reasoned that "the concept of a 'tort' is inextricably bound up with remedies"
such that "consideration of the remedies available.., is critical in determining the 'nature
of the statute' and the 'type of claim' brought," id. at 237 n.7.
In sum, Burke effectively supplanted Threlkeld insofar as the nature of the claim
analysis was now directed at the plaintiff's remedies (i.e., at the consequences of the
injury). Yet while the new procedure for identifying a tort-like personal injury claim was
remarkably different than before, commentators at the time believed the reasoning of
Burke would still permit exclusion of damages received under most federal employment
discrimination statutes. See Richard T. Helleloid & Lucretia S. W. Mattson, Has the Scope
of the Personal Injury Exclusion Been Changed by the Supreme Court?, 77 J. TAX'N 82,82-
85 (1992); see also Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61, suspended, I.R.S. Notice 95-45, 1995-34
I.R.B. 20 (applying Burke to allow exclusion of damages received from various types of
discrimination claims).
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characteristics.' 64 In holding for the Service on this issue, Justice
Blackmun emphasized that the sole remedial focus of Title VII was
back wages,'6 and he pointed specifically to the absence of the right
to a jury trial and the lack of a provision for punitive damages as
factors cutting against the classification of Title VII as a personal
injury action based upon tort or tort type rights."6 In the end, the
Court simply found that "[n]othing in this remedial scheme purports
to recompense a Title VII plaintiff for any of the other traditional
harms associated with personal injury, such as pain and suffering,
emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other consequential
damages."'67 Accordingly, the taxpayer was ordered to include the
back wages she received under the pre-1991 Title VII provisions in
her gross income.'6s
Subsequent application of the Supreme Court's decision in Burke
to damages recovered under the ADEA proved difficult, and the
federal courts became substantially divided over the issue of taxability
of such amounts.'69 Following Burke, courts generally agreed that
for purposes of determining whether an ADEA claim seeks to redress
a tort-like personal injury, the focus must be directed at the remedial
structure of the Act.'70 At this point, however, the agreement
ended. One line of cases evaluated the remedies available under the
ADEA and concluded that the existence of back pay, liquidated
damages (whether compensatory or punitive), and the right to a jury
trial were sufficient to bring the ADEA within Burke's conception of
a tort-like claim.' In stark contrast, another line of cases held that
164. Burke, 504 U.S. at 237-42.
165. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994).
166. Burke, 504 U.S. 237-42.
167. Id. at 239. The Court contrasted the "circumscribed" remedies available under
Title VII to the broader selection of remedies available under other federal
antidiscrimination statutes such as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994), and the fair housing provisions
of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, implying that damages awarded under these
actions would satisfy § 104(a)(2). See id. at 239-42.
168. Burke, 504 U.S. at 242.
169. See cases cited infra notes 171-72.
170. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790,792 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115
S. Ct. 2573 (1995) (mem.); Maleszewski v. United States, 827 F. Supp. 1553, 1557 (N.D.
Fla. 1993).
171. See Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 792-94; Rice v. United States, 834 F. Supp. 1241, 1243-45
(E.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd without published opinion, 35 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115
S. Ct. 2573 (1995) (mem.); Bennett v. United States, 30 Cl. Ct. 396, 399-400 (1994), rev'd
per curiam, 60 F.3d 843 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 634, 637
(1993), rev'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995); see also
Purcell v. Seguin State Bank & Trust Co., 999 F.2d 950, 960-61 (5th Cir. 1993) (relying on
Tax Court's decision in Downey and holding that ADEA award is nontaxable in context
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the ADEA did not provide for the broad range of compensatory
remedies required under a more narrow interpretation of Burke."
Moreover, the debate over the proper function of ADEA liquidated
damages continued to rage, 3 with both sides advancing the various
arguments highlighted previously.74 At this point, it was clear that
the issue of whether § 104(a)(2) should allow exclusion of ADEA
recoveries from gross income was ripe for review by the Supreme
Court.
A profitable way to analyze the Schleier decision will be to first
examine the genesis of the two requirements found to exist under
§ 104(a)(2)," s and then to explore the Court's application of these
requirements along with the implications flowing therefrom. The
starting point for this discussion must involve a review of the language
of § 104(a)(2);, 6 which reveals two things about the criteria for
exclusion of damages under the statute. First, there must be an
underlying "personal injury;" and second, the damages must be
received "on account of' that personal injury.
Neither the text nor the legislative history of § 104(a)(2) offers
an explanation of what constitutes a "personal injury" for purposes of
of reviewing amount of judgment for ADEA violation); Burns v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M.
(CCH) 3116 (1994) (Tax Court memorandum decision following Downey). These cases
are basically consistent with the second argument in Justice O'Connor's dissent in Schleier.
See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
Of these cases, Schmitz was the first to utilize a formal two-part test for determining
whether ADEA damages were excludable under § 104(a)(2). See Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 792.
In the Ninth Circuit, the taxpayer had to show both that (1) the underlying cause of action
was a tort-like claim within the meaning of Burke; and (2) the damages were received "on
account of" personal injuries. Id. As stated in the accompanying text, the court answered
the tort-like claim issue in the affirmative. After determining that ADEA liquidated
damages compensated for intangible losses, the Court held that such damages also satisfied
the second requirement. Id. at 794-96. Although not challenged by the IRS, the court
stated in dictum that back wages would also be considered as received on account of
personal injuries. Id. at 794 n.4.
172. Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836, 838-40 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 2576 (1995); Drase v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 1077, 1079-80 (N.D. I!!. 1994); Shaw
v. United States, 853 F. Supp. 1378, 1380-82 (M.D. Ala. 1994); Maleszewski, 827 F. Supp.
at 1555-57.
173. Compare Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 794-96 (ADEA liquidated damages are punitive and
compensatory) and Rice, 834 F. Supp. at 1244-45 (same) with Drase, 866 F. Supp. at 1080
(ADEA liquidated damages are punitive only) and Maleszewski, 827 F. Supp. at 1556-57
(same).
174. See supra notes 51-54, 145-54 and accompanying text.
175. See supra text accompanying note 35.
176. See supra note 3 for the relevant text of the statute.
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the statute. 77 The courts, therefore, have been forced to improvise.
Their solution attempts not to define precisely what constitutes a
personal injury per se, but rather to identify the type of claim
designed to redress such an injury. By reference to the Treasury's
regulations, 78 courts have long associated claims for personal injury
under § 104(a)(2) with legal actions based upon tort or tort type
rights. 79 Following Burke, the Schleier Court properly concluded
that exclusion of damages under § 104(a)(2) is only appropriate when
the "underlying cause of action giving rise to the recovery is 'based
upon tort or tort type rights.' ""s However, this "definition" still
fails to define what constitutes an action based upon tort or tort type
rights.
Not surprisingly, the Schleier Court also embraced the analysis in
Burke, which focused on the remedies available to the plaintiff for
purposes of determining whether a claim represents a tort-like cause
of action.' 8' Following the Burke rhetoric closely, the Court
concluded that the ADEA does not provide the requisite spread of
compensatory remedies associated with a typical personal injury
claim."' The fundamental problem inherent in this approach is that
it leads to discrepant tax results with respect to similarly situated
individuals."' For example, a claim of intentional gender
177. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1954), reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4025, 4039-40; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1954), reprinted
in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4645-46; H.R. REp. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess 9-10 (1918),
reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 86, 92.
178. See supra note 36 for the relevant text of the regulation.
179. See, eg., United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 233 (1992) ("IRS regulations
formally have linked identification of a personal injury for purposes of § 104(a)(2) to
traditional tort principles."); Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1121 (6th Cir. 1991)
("Treasury regulations define a claim for personal injuries under § 104(a)(2) as one which
is based upon 'tort or tort-type rights.' "), rev'd on other grounds, 504 U.S. 229 (1992);
Byrne v. Commissioner, 883 F.2d 211, 214 (3d Cir. 1989) ("As defined by the relevant
regulation, personal injury claims assert violations of'tort or tort type rights.' "); Threlkeld
v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1305 (1986) (en bane) ("[Clommon law tort concepts are
helpful in deciding whether a taxpayer is being compensated for a 'personal injury.' "),
aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
180. Schiejer, 115 S. Ct. at 2167.
181. See id at 2166-67; see also supra notes 157-68 and accompanying text for a review
of Burke.
182. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2166-67. For a detailed discussion of the Court's analysis,
see supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
183. For an extensive criticism of Burke's focus on the remedies available to the injured
plaintiff, see Scott E. Copple, How Many Remedies Make a Tort? The Aftermath of U.S.
v. Burke and its Impact on the Taxability of Discrimination Awards, 14 VA. TAX REV. 589,
599-603 (1995).
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discrimination brought under current, amended Title VII14 would
presumably qualify as tort-like under the principles of Burke,85
whereas the exact same claim brought under the pre-1991 version of
the statute clearly would not. 6 In both situations, however, the
victim has been subjected to exactly the same discriminatory conduct
and has suffered exactly the same harm or personal injury.Y7
This type of disparity is easily avoided under a true application
of the Threlkeld "nature of the claim" analysis, which does not
consider the consequences of the injury. 8 To recapitulate, a court
following the Threlkeld approach would seek to determine whether
the harm suffered by the victim constitutes an "invasion of the rights
that an individual is granted by virtue of being a person in the sight
of the law."' 9 After considering the reasoning of a decision such
as Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 9° which characterized racial
discrimination as a fundamental injury to an individual's personal
rights,'9 ' it logically follows that sex discrimination, an equally
184. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 2000e to 2000e-17
(1994) (effective as amended Nov. 21, 1991). In addition to back wages, see § 2000e-5(g),
the amended version of Title VII also provides victims of intentional employment
discrimination with a trial by jury and allows recovery of compensatory damages (including
amounts for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of
enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses) and punitive damages, see § 1981a.
185. See Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61, suspended, I.R.S. Notice 95-45,1995-34 I.R.B.
20; Helleloid & Mattson, supra note 163, at 83-84; CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
No. 95-827, THE TAX-TREATMENT OF DISCRIMINATION AWARDS: COMMISSIONER V.
SCHLEIER (1995), available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 582419 (C.R.S.).
186. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 242 (1992).
187. Justice O'Connor essentially raises this point in her dissenting opinions in Burke
and Schleier by arguing that "the remedies available to Title VII plaintiffs do not fix the
character of the right they seek to enforce." See Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2169 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); Burke, 504 U.S. at 239 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Copple, supra
note 183, at 602 ("The amendment to Title VII has only changed the remedies available
to the injured party, not the nature of the injury itself.").
188. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1299 (1986) (en bane) ("To determine
whether the injury complained of is personal, we must look to the origin and character of
the claim and not to the consequences that result from the injury.") (citations omitted),
affd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988); accord Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 699
(1983) ("The personal nature of an injury should not be defined by its effect.").
189. Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1308. This standard is consonant with the popular definition
of personal injury. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 786 (6th ed. 1990) ("[T]he term
[personal injury] is also used (usually in statutes) ... as including any injury which is an
invasion of personal rights."). Defining "personal injury" in this manner for purposes of
§ 104(a) (2) seems particularly appropriate given that our Supreme Court has indicated that
"the words of statutes-including revenue acts-should be interpreted where possible in
their ordinary, everyday senses." Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1947).
190. 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
191. Id. at 661; see also cases cited supra note 136.
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reprehensible form of invidious discrimination, should likewise be
placed in the same category regardless of any differences in the types
of remedies available to redress the respective claims."2 Remedies
are simply a tool to measure the extent of damages sustained from an
injury-they do not define the type of injury that has occurred.193
Courts prior to Burke overwhelmingly applied the Threlkeld
analysis to find that most kinds of employment discrimination caused
a personal injury for purposes of § 104(a)(2)." But today, for
example, victims of age discrimination will have to pay income tax on
damages they recover,'95  while victims of intentional sex
discrimination presumably will not.'96 There does not appear to be
any rational policy justification for treating these types of
discrimination differently for federal income tax purposes. The parity
that would again exist if the Threlkeld approach were followed, in
terms of the taxability of damages recovered by victims of invidious
employment discrimination, is apparent.
Nevertheless, Schleier reaffirmed that for purposes of determining
whether a particular cause of action is "based upon tort or tort type
rights," Burke's emphasis on the remedies available to the plaintiff is
the appropriate mode of analysis.Y Upon satisfaction of this
threshold inquiry, the Schleier majority also declared that § 104(a)(2)
contains an additional requirement that taxpayers must demonstrate
192. See Metzger v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834, 856 (1987) ("[A]lthough the relief
sought under one statute may in some cases be different from the relief sought under the
other statute, the injuries complained of are often essentially the same."), aff'd without
published opinion, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988); Nina Krauthamer, The Taxability of Title
VII "Back Pay" Awards, 54 TAXES 332, 337 (1976) (arguing the proper question for
determining excludability of damages from pre-1991 Title VH action is whether the act of
discrimination causes personal injury, not whether the recovery represents back wages).
193. Cf. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693,699 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The nonpersonal
consequences of a personal injury, such as a loss of future income, are often the most
persuasive means of proving the extent of the injury that was suffered."). Defining an
injury by reference to its consequences, as opposed to the nature of the claim, exemplifies
a classic situation of the "tail wagging the dog."
194. See, eg., Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1121-22 (6th Cir. 1991) (sex
discrimination), rev'd, 504 U.S. 229 (1992); Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 661-64
(3d Cir. 1990) (age discrimination); Metzger, 88 T.C. at 857-58 (discrimination based on sex
and national origin); cf. Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661 (racial discrimination).
195. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167.
196. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text. Although Title VII claimants
should be able to exclude compensatory damages they receive from income, back wages
will most likely be taxable after Schleier. See infra notes 240-43 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
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that their damages were received "on account of" personal in-
juries.198
The Court principally relied on the "plain language" of
§ 104(a)(2) as the basis for adopting this second requirement.199
Justice Stevens then defined the requirement using a rather con-
voluted analysis involving illustrations and hypotheticals, ° again
relying on "plain language" to conclude that ADEA back wages and
liquidated damages were not received on account of personal
injuries.' While the statute undoubtedly speaks of "damages
received ... on account of personal injuries,"' ~ this language is
"anything but plain" and alone is not supportive of the Court's
restrictive reading of § 104(a)(2).' Rather, the text of the statute
is ambiguous with respect to when damages are received "on account
of" personal injuries.' 4 The Ninth Circuit in Hawkins v. United
States'°5 captured the essence of the problem, recognizing that
" '[d]amages received on account of personal injury' could mean all
damages recovered in a personal injury lawsuit, or, it could mean only
those damages which purport to compensate the taxpayer for her
personal injuries."'' 6
To employ the former interpretation literally would effectively
mean that the only requirement for exclusion under § 104(a)(2) would
be that the taxpayer must establish the existence of a tort-like
personal injury; the "on account of" language would have no
independent significance, because once a personal injury is found to
198. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167.
199. Ld. at 2163, 2167; see also supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. It is fair to
say that this second requirement was "adopted" by the Court for the first time in Schleier
because Burke, the only other Supreme Court decision interpreting § 104(a)(2), did not
explicitly mention, or even allude to, the existence of such a requirement. See Schleier, 115
S. Ct. at 2171 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Every member of the [Burke] Court so
understood the opinion-that the scope of § 104(a)(2) is defined in terms of traditional
tort principles.").
200. See Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2163-64; see also supra notes 44-48 and accompanying
text.
201. See Schieler, 115 S. Ct. at 2164-65.
202. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994).
203. See Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2172 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Indeed, the trouble
encountered by Justice Stevens in clearly articulating his reasoning in this part of the
opinion exemplifies this point.
204. Wesson v. United States, 48 F.3d 894, 897 (5th Cir. 1995); Hawkins v. United
States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995); Reese v.
United States, 24 F.3d 228,230-31 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586,
589-90 (4th Cir. 1990).
205. 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995).
206. Id at 1080 (emphasis added).
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exist, any and all types of damages received, including punitive
damages, would be ipso facto treated as received on account of
personal injuries.' Such an approach does not, however, ignore
the "on account of" language in the statute.' Rather, it interprets
the phrase as requiring merely a "but for" causal relationship between
the damages received and the personal injury. 'The arguments in
support of this interpretation are compelling.
The language used by Congress in drafting § 104(a)(2) manifestly
invites a broad interpretation of the statute. Section 104(a)(2) speaks
of "any damages received.., on account of personal injuries,"2' as
opposed to only compensatory damages. Several courts have
recognized that "any damages" suggests "all damages. ' 1'
Moreover, the phrase "on account of" should likewise be interpreted
broadly. The Tax Court referred to Webster's ]Dictionary, which
defines "on account of" as "for the sake of," "by reason of," or
"because of," noting that these phrases suggest causation.212 Con-
gress would presumably have used more restrictive language, like "as
compensation for," if it intended more than the basic "but for" causal
nexus implied by these popular definitions. 21
207. The Sixth Circuit, see Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625,630-31 (6th Cir. 1994),
and the Tax Court, see Horton v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 93, 96 (1993), affd, 33 F.3d 625
(6th Cir. 1994); Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330,338-40 (1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th
Cir. 1990), adopted this interpretation. Judge Trott also advocated this position in a
poignant dissenting opinion. See Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1085 (Trott, J., dissenting).
Although Schleier did not involve punitive damages, Justice O'Connor's dissent seems to
embrace this view as well. See Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2170-72 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
In fact, even the IRS formally accepted this position at one time. See Rev. Rul. 75-45,
1975-1 C.B. 47, 47-48, revoked, Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32, 34.
208. Justice Stevens dubbed this argument an attempt to "circumvent the plain
language of § 104(a)(2)." See Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2165.
209. See Horton, 33 F.3d at 631; Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1085-86 (Trott, J., dissenting);
Miller, 93 T.C. at 339-40. Applying this reasoning, punitive damages, for example, would
be excludable since they would not otherwise be available "but for" the existence of the
basic personal injury claim. See Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1085 (Trott, J., dissenting)
("[Plunitive damages are received on account of personal injury because punitive damages
are not available unless a personal injury has occurred."); accord Horton, 33 F.3d at 630;
Miller, 93 T.C. at 339-40.
210. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
211. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1084 (Trott, J., dissenting) (citing Miller, 93 T.C. at 338);
accord Horton, 33 F.3d at 631.
212. Miller, 93 T.C. at 339.
213. Id. at 338 ("Congress ... could have excluded only 'compensatory damages' or
provided that only damages received 'as compensation for' personal injuries be excluded.
It did neither.") (citation omitted); accord Horton, 33 F.3d at 631; Hawkins, 30 F.3d at
1084 (Trott, J., dissenting).
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This broad interpretation of § 104(a)(2) is also consistent with a
logical reading of the statute and underlying regulation together.
Although § 1.104-1(c) purports to define only the phrase "damages
received (whether by suit or agreement), 214 the overall context of
the regulation suggests otherwise. The term "damages" is a broad
judicial concept used to describe all kinds of indemnity, be it
"inflicted on property or person, based on contract or tort, [or]
received by suit or agreement. 2 15 The language of the statute itself,
not the regulation, performs the function of narrowing and defining
the scope of this expression by injecting the phrase "on account of
personal injuries." This modifier is the elusive phrase in need of
regulative interpretation.
Thus, it seems more sensible to read the second sentence of the
regulation as follows: The phrase "damages received on account of
personal injuries" means an amount received through prosecution of
a legal action based upon tort or tort type rights.216 Such a
construction would permit exclusion of any amount received as
damages through this type of legal action. Moreover, the fact that the
full text of § 104(a)(2) is repeated in the first sentence of the
regulation does not, as Justice Stevens suggests, militate against this
interpretation.217 On the contrary, it seems perfectly reasonable for
the regulation to first lay out the language that it seeks to define. As
the Schleier dissent persuasively argued, "[i]t is surely more reason-
able to read the regulation as defining an ambiguous statutory phrase,
rather than as imposing a superfluous precondition without any
statutory basis. 2 18
214. See supra note 36 for the complete text of the regulation.
215. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2171-72 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The term "damages" has
been defined to mean "[a] pecuniary compensation or indemnity, which may be recovered
in the courts by any person who has suffered loss, detriment, or injury, whether to his
person, property, or rights, through the unlawful act or omission or negligence of another."
BLACK'S LAW DICIoNARY 389 (6th ed. 1990).
216. See Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2172 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("In light of ... the
futility of any attempt to define only 'damages received,' the regulation is more sensibly
read as defining the entire scope of § 104(a)(2)."); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229,
242 n.1 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Though this regulation purports
expressly to define only the term 'damages received,' and not the succeeding term ...
('personal injuries'), the IRS has long treated the regulation as descriptive of the ambit of
§ 104(a)(2) as a whole.") (citation omitted).
217. As additional support for his conclusion that the second sentence of the regulation
supplements § 104(a)(2) with a conjunctive requirement, Justice Stevens argued that "the
statutory requirement is repeated in the [first sentence of the] regulation." Schleier, 115
S. Ct. at 2166.
218. Id. at 2172 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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The notion that § 104(a)(2) embraces only one functional
requirement for exclusion is further supported by an examination of
the results that follow from the decisions employing a formal two-part
analysis similar to that set forth in Schleier.219 These courts, con-
cerned about allowing exclusion of punitive damages under
§ 104(a)(2), adopted a more restrictive interpretation of the phrase
"on account of' personal injuries.' They accomplished their goal
of denying an exclusion for punitive damages by distinguishing
damages designed to compensate the plaintiff from damages designed
to punish the tortfeasor2 ' As the Hawkins court explained,
"[p]unitive damages ... which do not purport to compensate the
taxpayer for personal injuries and which bear no relation to the
severity of the taxpayer's injuries, are not necessarily awarded 'on
account of' personal injuries; rather, they are awarded 'on account of'
the tortfeasor's egregious conduct."' This reasoning would apply
equally to punitive damages received in cases involving physical or
nonphysical injuries.
An interpretation of § 104(a)(2), restricted as such, gives the "on
account of" language status as an independent requirement that serves
219. Prior to Schleier, several circuits had already formally adopted a two-part test for
exclusion under § 104(a)(2). Wesson v. United States, 48 F.3d 894, 901-02 (5th Cir. 1995);
Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1083-84 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2576 (1995); Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228, 235 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
220. See Wesson, 48 F.3d at 898-902; Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1080-83; Reese, 24 F.3d at 230-
35; Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 589-91 (4th Cir. 1990). The Fourth Circuit in
Miller provided the impetus for this movement by construing the statute to require a
standard of what it labeled "sufficient causation" that is satisfied only when the taxpayer's
personal injury in and of itself justifies recovery of the particular damages at issue. 914
F.2d at 589-91.
221. See Wesson, 48 F.3d at 899-901; Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1083; Reese, 24 F.3d at 231;
Miller, 914 F.2d at 589.
222. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1080; accord Wesson, 48 F.3d at 900; Reese, 24 F.3d at 231;
Miller, 914 F.2d at 590. Advocates of this position generally relied on three principal
arguments. First, § 104 is entitled "Compensation for injuries or sickness." E.g., Reese,
24 F.3d at 231. Second, the established rules for interpreting federal income tax statutes
require that the definition of gross income is to be interpreted broadly while exclusions
therefrom must be narrowly construed. E.g., Wesson, 48 F.3d at 899; see also supra note
92 and accompanying text. Finally, the historic underpinnings of § 104(a)(2) have focused
on allowing exclusion of damages intended to restore a loss of capital; punitive damages,
however, represent a windfall to the victim and do not fit this mold. E.g., Miller, 914 F.2d
at 590-91; see also Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432 n.8 (1955)
("Punitive damages ... cannot be considered a restoration of capital for taxation
purposes."). Relying on these arguments, courts have concluded that "Congress did not
intend section 104(a)(2) to exclude from gross income noncompensatory damages such as
punitive damages." Reese, 24 F.3d at 231, quoted in Wesson, 48 F.3d at 899, and cited in
Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1084 & n.8.
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to deny exclusion of certain types of damages, such as punitive
damages, 3 that would otherwise qualify under the statute if the
only requirement were the existence of a tort-like personal injury.224
Accordingly, courts adopting this type of analysis began to formally
recognize that § 104(a)(2) has two separate and distinct requirements
that must be satisfied before exclusion is permitted.'
The fact that a two-prong § 104(a)(2) analysis serves to deny
exclusion of punitive damages received in all cases, involving both
physical and nonphysical injuries alike, helps bring to the forefront
the critical shortfall of this approach. The flush language of
§ 104(a)(2) as amended expressly provides that "[p]aragraph (2) shall
not apply to any punitive damages in connection with a case not
involving physical injury."'  By negative implication, it seems clear
that Congress must have therefore intended for punitive damages
received in cases involving physical injury to be excludable from
income. 7  Consequently, use of a two-part analysis under
223. Interestingly, all indicators at this point led to the conclusion that, assuming the
underlying claim fell within Burke's conception of an action based upon tort or tort type
rights, back wages received in the employment discrimination context would satisfy the "on
account of" personal injuries requirement. In Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790, 794
n.4 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2573 (1995) (mem.), the Ninth Circuit, which
authored the Hawkins opinion, suggested such a result in dictum. The IRS apparently
shared this perspective. Although the Service held in Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32,
34, that punitive damages are not excludable from income since they are not awarded on
account of personal injury, it also held in Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61, 62-63, that back
wages received under several federal antidiscrimination statutes (found to represent tort-
like causes of action under Burke) would be excludable. To the extent the holding in Rev.
Rul. 84-108 represents the IRS's attempt to invoke a separate "on account of" personal
injuries requirement, the unavoidable implication of the holding in Rev. Rul. 93-88 is that
back wages received from discrimination claims must necessarily satisfy this test. Rev. Rul.
93-88 was subsequently suspended in light of the Schleier decision. I.R.S. Notice 95-45,
1995-34 I.RIB. 20.
224. See Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625, 630-31 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding that
punitive damages are excludable from income once the existence of a tort-like personal
injury is established).
225. Wesson, 48 F.3d at 898; Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1082; see Reese, 24 F.3d at 235.
226. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994); see also supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
227. Justice Blackmun offered such an interpretation of the statutory amendment in
Burke. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229,236 n.6 (1992) (dictum) ("Congress amended
§ 104(a) to allow the exclusion of punitive damages only in cases involving 'physical injury
or physical sickness.' "); accord Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1086 (Trott, J., dissenting) ("After
Congress's narrowing of the exclusion in 1989, only punitive damages received in personal
injury cases involving physical injury or sickness were excludable."). Several commentators
also share this view. MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 42 (7th ed.
1994); WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOSEPH BANKMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 228 (10th
ed. 1994); Mark Wright Cochran, 1989 Tax Act Compounds Confusion over Tax Status of
Personal Injury Damages, 49 TAX NOTES 1565, 1567 (1990); Margaret Henning, Recent
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§ 104(a)(2) will lead to the inevitable result that punitive damages
received in cases involving physical injury are not excludable from
income, a result that flies in the face of the statute itself.
Despite these shortfalls, the Schleier decision made perfectly clear
that § 104(a)(2) does contain two separate and distinct requirements
that must be satisfied before damages can be excluded from gross
income.' Accordingly, the focus will now be shifted to an
examination of the Court's application of these requirements in
Developments in the Tax Treatment of Personal Injury and Punitive Damage Recoveries,
45 TAX LAW. 783,800-01 (1992); David G. Jaeger, Taxation of Punitive Damage Awards:
The Continuing Controversy, 57 TAX NOTES 109, 114 (1992); James Serven, The Taxation
of Punitive Damages: Horton Lays an Egg?, 72 DENV. U. L. REv. 215, 261, 291 (1995).
This reading of the 1989 amendment has intuitive appeal. There are several plausible
ways to interpret congressional intent behind the amendment. See generally Hawkins, 30
F.3d at 1086-87 (Trott, J., dissenting) (analyzing the possible explanations for the 1989
amendment to § 104(a)(2)); Cochran, supra, at 1567 (same); Serven, supra, at 260-66
(same).
First, Congress may have believed that punitive damages received in all personal
injury cases were excludable from income prior to 1989, and it enacted the amendment to
narrow the scope of § 104(a)(2) by making post-1989 punitive damages received in cases
involving nonphysical injuries taxable, while allowing those received with respect to
physical injuries to remain excludable under the statute. This interpretation seems most
consistent with the tenor of the legislative history, in which Congress manifestly expressed
an intent to narrow the scope of § 104(a)(2). See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying
text.
Congress may have thought likewise that all punitive damages were excludable prior
to 1989, but it enacted the amendment to deny exclusion in all cases. If this was its
purpose, however, it seems that the amending language would have affirmatively referred
to all punitive damages instead of just those received in cases "not involving physical
injury."
Alternatively, Congress may have thought that all punitive damages were taxable
under pre-1989 law, and it enacted the amendment to reflect clearly this position by
statute. This would mean, however, that the amendment had no substantive effect because
the law did not change, and it can scarcely be argued that Congress intended its enactment
to be mere surplusage. Even assuming for the moment that the amendment was a
provision designed simply to clarify existing law and to legislatively overrule all cases
holding to the contrary, it can again be said that Congress presumably would have referred
to all punitive damages in the amending language if that was its intention.
Finally, regardless of whether it had any understanding of the taxation of punitive
damages under pre-1989 law, Congress may have enacted the amendment to speak only
to punitive damages received for nonphysical injuries and therefore left the issue of
taxation of punitive damages awarded for physical injuries to the courts. Such a result,
however, seems awkward since it deliberately leaves the law in a state of confusion in the
latter context. Moreover, assuming some consensus regarding the tax status of punitive
damages received for physical injuries did emerge, Congress would be required to take
action a second time if it did not agree with the prevailing judicial result. In the end, the
first justification offered above provides the most coherent rationale for the 1989
amendment.
228. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167.
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Schleier in order to understand the implications for damages received
outside the ADEA context.
Recall that the first requirement of Schleier's two-prong test
requires the taxpayer to demonstrate that the underlying cause of
action giving rise to his damages recovery is "based upon tort or tort
type rights." 9  The principles of Burke indicate that the remedies
available from the claim at issue are of paramount importance in
making this determination."3 The Schleier decision has narrowed
the scope of what types of remedies meet the Burke requirements.
The Court went beyond Burke's holding that back wages alone do not
qualify 1 and announced that provisions for a jury trial and punitive
damages complementing relief in the form of back wages are still
insufficient."2 The Schleier majority apparently interpreted Burke
to mean that a tort-like claim must, at a minimum, provide compen-
satory relief for what it termed " 'any of the other traditional harms
associated with personal injury, such as pain and suffering, emotional
distress, harm to reputation, or other consequential damages.' ""
Even after considering these slight refinements, significant
questions remain regarding application of this test to discrimination
awards, since Schleier did not leave us with an affirmative example of
what constitutes an action "based upon tort or tort type rights" in this
context. For instance, Schleier did not disclose how many different
types of these "other" compensatory remedies are required.' Also,
assuming a given claim does provide for one or more "other"
compensatory remedies, it remains to be seen whether that alone is
sufficient, or whether a jury trial and/or punitive damages are
229. See supra text accompanying note 35.
230. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
231. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 241 (1992).
232. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
233. See Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167 (emphasis added) (quoting Burke, 504 U.S. at 239).
234. On the one hand, Schieler suggests that a variety of different types of compen-
satory remedies are required. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2166-67 ("[O]ne of the hallmarks of
traditional tort liability is the availability of a broad range of damages to compensate the
plaintiff.") (emphasis added) (quoting Burke, 504 U.S. at 235). The examples cited by
Justice Blackmun in Burke as indicative of typical tort claims, namely cases involving
physical injury and defamation, all possess this characteristic. See Burke, 504 U.S. at 235-
37. On the other hand, however, the precise language of Burke and Schlefer stated that
the discrimination statutes at issue did not contain "any of the other traditional harms
associated with personal injury," thereby permitting an inference that only one of these
"other" compensatory remedies is required. See Bennett v. United States, 30 Cl. Ct. 396,
400 (1994), rev'd per curiam, 60 F.3d 843 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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necessary attributes in addition.,Y Consequently, litigation on this
issue will likely continue on a case-by-case basis as different types of
claims are tested or until more definitive standards are pronounced.
The second prong of Schleier's test for exclusion under
§ 104(a)(2) requires the taxpayer to show that his damages were
received "on account of" personal injuries-1 6 Under the majority's
formulation, this means that the taxpayer must suffer a personal
injury, which in turn must "cause" the damages sought to be excluded
(i.e., there must be some intermediate causal nexus between the
personal injury and the damages suffered),z 7  The substance of
Justice Stevens's analysis here implies that something more than a
mere "but for" standard of causation is required. According to
Schleier, the extent of the personal injury must actually affect the
amount of damages recovered for those damages to be regarded as
received "on account of' personal injuries. 8 Each element of the
taxpayer's damages recovery will need to be examined separately to
determine whether this type of direct causal relationship exists.
Although the Court's analysis in this part of the opinion is less than
a model of clarity, several generalizations can be made.
First, Schleier made clear that all compensatory damages received
for physical injuries, including lost wages, are received on account of
personal injuries. 9 Likewise, where a federal antidiscrimination
statute or similar claim involving nonphysical injury expressly provides
a compensatory remedy for intangible mental harms, such as
emotional distress, pain and suffering, etc., the related damages should
also qualify.2' However, the substance of the Court's application
of its on account of personal injuries test to ADEA back wages24
would be the same regardless of the type of discrimination claim
involved, since the requisite causal nexus between the personal injury
235. The Court in Burke cited 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) and the fair
housing provisions of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 as examples of federal
antidiscrimination statutes that presumably possess a tort-like remedial scheme. See Burke,
504 U.S. at 240. Both of these claims, like the physical injury and defamation claims
referred to previously, provide for a jury trial, punitive damages, and compensatory relief.
Id.
236. See supra text accompanying note 35.
237. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
238. See Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2164. For example, as the severity of physical injuries
sustained by a victim of an automobile accident increases, the amount of damages
recoverable for pain and suffering should likewise increase.
239. See id., 115 S. Ct. at 2163-64.
240. See id. at 2165 n.6.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
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and loss of wages, implicit in Justice Stevens's analysis, will always be
lacking. 42 Therefore, Schleier almost certainly marks the end of the
exclusion for back wages recovered from employment discrimination
claims involving a wrongful discharge.24
Consistent with the line of cases leading up to Schleier, which
held that true punitive damages were not excludable from gross
income,2 44 the Court's on account of personal injuries requirement
will effect the same result.24 In Schleier, Justice Stevens found that
ADEA liquidated damages were entirely punitive, and therefore such
damages were adjudged not to have been received on account of
personal injuries.2' Although not explicitly stated, the rationale for
this conclusion almost certainly follows that of the majority of
appellate courts247-- punitive damages are received on account of the
tortfeasor's egregious conduct, not on account of any personal injury
sustained by the taxpayer.2' That is, punitive damages do not bear
242. A rare exception to this rule would be a situation where a mental injury, such as
emotional distress, is the cause of the victim's inability to work, as opposed to the
employer's wrongful discharge (e.g., a discrimination case to recover for an unjustified
salary differential where the plaintiff's employment was not wrongfully terminated).
243. See Burns v. United States, No. 94-16639, 1996 WL 26936, at *4 (9th Cir. Jan. 24,
1996) ("In the context of a wrongful discharge suit, economic damages are not received
on account of personal injury.") (citing Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2164); BITrKER &
MCMAHON, supra note 93, 7.3[2], at S7-2 to S7-3 (Supp. 1996) ("[W]hile a wrongful
discharge may cause a personal injury, back-pay damages are not received on account of
that personal injury; the back-pay damages are received on account of the economic injury
caused by the discharge."). What this essentially means is that although an
antidiscrimination statute like Title VII may qualify as a tort-like cause of action under the
principles of Burke, see supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text, to say that the claim
involves a personal injury does not necessarily mean that the claim is fully about personal
injury. This realization follows from the different income tax consequences applicable to
compensatory damages (excludable) and back wages (taxable) recovered under the same
statute.
244. See cases cited supra note 222.
245. See Lane v. United States, 902 F. Supp. 1439, 1443 (W.D. Okla. 1995) ("The Court
is constrained by a recent pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court in
[Schleier] to conclude that punitive damages are not 'received on account of personal
injury or sickness' and are therefore not excludable from gross income under Section
104(a)(2) .... ).
246. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
248. See Lane, 902 F.Supp. at 1443-44. Following Schlefer, courts have employed a
similar type of analysis to deny exclusion of prejudgment interest under § 104(a)(2),
holding that such amounts are not received "on account of" personal injury because they
are intended to compensate plaintiffs for the lost time value of money, not for their
injuries. See Brabson v. United States, 73 F.3d 1040, 1046-47 (10th Cir. 1996)
("[Clompensation for the lost time value of money is caused by the delay in attaining
judgment. Time becomes the relevant factor, not the injury itself-the longer the
procedural delay, the higher the amount.").
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the direct causal link with the victim's personal injury required by
Schleier, since the amount of punitive damages awarded generally
covaries positively with the degree of the tortfeasor's conduct, not
with the extent of the injury sustained. This analysis would apply the
same regardless of whether the case involves physical or nonphysical
injuries. Henceforth, courts will only need to examine applicable state
law, or background materials related to federal statutes, to determine
whether amounts labeled as punitive damages are wholly penal in
nature and therefore not excludable, or whether they embrace some
compensatory purpose such that exclusion is possible.249
Application of Schleier's on account of personal injuries require-
ment to damages received from a common law dignitary tort, such as
defamation, presents an interesting issue. To the extent the language
of Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion suggests that such damages
will no longer be excludable,' 0 her conclusion is debatable. Defa-
mation inflicts a personal injury--it results in an injury to the
victim's good name, which in turn may cause both personal losses,
such as humiliation, personal embarrassment, or loss of standing in
the community, and professional losses, such as loss of future business
revenue. Regardless of the type of loss incurred, the important point
to recognize is that such losses all derive from the same source '
and the extent of these losses is causally connected to the extent of
the victim's personal injury as required by Schleier253 Therefore,
the result in cases such as Roemer and Threlkeld should still be
correct.
In conclusion, the most immediate consequence of Schleier is
obviously that ADEA damages can no longer be excluded from gross
249. See, eg., Estate of Moore v. Commissioner, 53 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 1995). The Tax
Court has apparently accepted this interpretation of Schlejer also, and thus it begrudgingly
indicated that it would not longer follow its Horton decision. See Bagley v. Commissioner,
No. 531-93, 1995 WL 730447 (T.C. Dec. 11, 1995) ("The Supreme Court has made it clear
in the Schleier case that damages which are not compensatory but puntive in nature are
not excludable from gross income under section 104(a)(2).").
250. See Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2169 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
251. It seems clear that defamation satisfies Burke's definition of an action based upon
tort or tort type rights, given that it was expressly used as a point of positive reference in
formulating the definition itself. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 235-36 (1992). In
addition, harm to reputation was expressly cited by the Court in both Schleier and Burke
as an example of one of the "traditional harms associated with personal injury." Schleier,
115 S. Ct. at 2167; Burke, 504 U.S. at 239.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.
253. For instance, the more flagrant and infamous the defamatory statement made
about the victim, the larger the amount of damages, both personal and professional, that
would be expected to result.
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income under § 104(a)(2).' However, the foregoing analysis
illustrates the profound effect this decision will have on the overall
scope of the statute. Schleier affirmed that the threshold inquiry
under § 104(a)(2) requires taxpayers to demonstrate that the claims
underlying their damages recoveries are "based upon tort or tort type
rights" within the meaning of Burke.' While the Court persists in
defining an action based upon tort or tort type rights according to the
types and breadth of remedies available, this Note suggests that such
an approach leads to discrepant federal income tax treatment of
similarly situated victims of invidious employment discrimination."6
Nevertheless, Schleier acted to narrow the types of remedies that are
sufficient to meet Burke's requirements, although the exact definition
of a tort-like cause of action remains somewhat questionable. 7
In addition, Schleier announced that § 104(a)(2) contains a
second requirement that taxpayers must establish that their damages
were received "on account of" personal injuries. 8  While the
restrictive interpretation ascribed to this language by the Court seems
inconsistent with a contextual reading of the statute and its underlying
Treasury regulation, 9 the ramifications of this requirement will
nonetheless be dramatic. Most significantly, the reasoning of Schleier
strongly suggests that back wages recovered in the employment
discrimination context2" and punitive damages (whether received in
connection with physical or nonphysical injuries)26' will no longer be
excludable from income.
Schleier's constriction of § 104(a)(2) encourages litigants in the
employment discrimination context now to allocate more of their
private settlements to excludable compensatory damages versus
taxable back wages. Moreover, the disparate tax treatment of
recoveries under various federal and state antidiscrimination statutes
encourages victims of discrimination to bring multiple claims with an
eye toward allocating at least part of the subsequent damages award
to those claims found to satisfy § 104(a)(2)'s requirements. 262
254. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167.
255. See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 182-97 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 229-35 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 202-28 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 24143 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 244-49 and accompanying text.
262. Perhaps some future employment discrimination cases will be similar to Metzger
v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834 (1987) (taxpayer brought multiple claims for employment
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However, these creative efforts may themselves become obsolete in
the near term as legislation has once again surfaced that would limit
the scope of § 104(a)(2) to damages received on account of physical
injuries only.2 In the end, even if the population of excludable
types of damages is reduced by Congress and/or Schleier, affected
taxpayers should nonetheless be made whole since juries are often
instructed on the tax status of judgments," which most likely will
lead to larger verdicts to compensate for the portion of recovery lost
to income taxes.2
JOHN W DOSTERT
discrimination on basis of sex and national origin under §§ 1981,1982,1983,1985(3), 1986,
and Title VII), affd without published opinion, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988).
263. The Balanced Budget Act of 1995 proposes to limit the scope of § 104(a)(2) to
damages received on account of physical injuries or physical sickness only. H.R. 2491,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1311 (1995). Under the proposed rules, all damages (other than
punitive damages) flowing from actions involving physical injury would be excludable from
income. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 350, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 1451 (1995). However,
exclusion of damages recovered from nonphysical injuries would be denied in toto. Id.
Thus, damages derived from claims involving employment discrimination, dignitary torts,
and emotional distress (not accompanied by physical injury) would be fully taxable. Id.
Furthermore, the proposed amendments would unequivocally require inclusion of all
punitive damages in income, regardless of whether received in connection with a physical
or nonphysical injury (a limited exception applies in cases involving certain wrongful death
actions). H.R. 2491, supra, § 11311; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 350, supra, at 1451-52. If
adopted, these provisions would generally become effective with respect to damages
received after December 31, 1995, although the amendments would not apply to amounts
received under a written binding agreement or court decree in effect on (or issued on or
before) September 13, 1995. H.R. 2491, supra, § 11311.
264. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980).
265. Cf. B=TTKER & MCMAHON, JR., supra note 93, 7.3[1], at 7-7 ("[A] repeal of
§104(a)(2) would create shock waves throughout the personal injury area and might well
lead to larger verdicts and higher insurance premiums.").
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